From 2,500 malls at peak to ~700 today β and falling
At their peak in the late 1980s, America had roughly 2,500 enclosed shopping malls. Today, that number has plummeted to around 700. Industry analysts project that 25% of the remaining malls will close by 2030. The causes are layered: e-commerce stole convenience, anchor department stores collapsed one by one, and the pandemic accelerated a decline that had been building for two decades. What was once the center of American suburban life is now, increasingly, a relic being converted into apartments, medical centers, and fulfillment warehouses.
In the late 1980s, enclosed malls dotted every suburb in America. The formula was simple: anchor department stores on each end, a food court in the middle, and specialty shops lining the corridors.
A 72% decline from peak. Many surviving malls are "zombie malls" β technically open but with high vacancy rates and dwindling foot traffic.
Roughly 25% of remaining malls are expected to close by 2030. The "death spiral" accelerates when anchor tenants leave, reducing foot traffic for smaller shops.
In the mid-1990s, Americans made an estimated 5.6 billion trips to shopping malls annually. By 2023, that number had fallen below 3 billion.
The anchor tenants that held malls together β and then let them fall
Sears was once the Amazon of its day β the largest retailer in the world, with 3,500 stores and a catalog that was effectively the internet before the internet existed. The Sears catalog sold everything from socks to entire houses (you could order a kit home from the Sears catalog between 1908 and 1940).
The decline began in the 1990s when Walmart surpassed Sears as America's largest retailer. But the death blow came from Eddie Lampert, the hedge fund manager who merged Sears with Kmart in 2005 and proceeded to strip both companies of their assets. Lampert's strategy of financial engineering over retail fundamentals β selling off brands like Craftsman and Lands' End, spinning off real estate β is now studied in business schools as an example of how private equity can destroy iconic companies.
Sears filed for bankruptcy in October 2018. From 3,500 stores to 12 in barely two decades. The Sears Tower in Chicago (now Willis Tower) stands as a monument to what was.
JCPenney's most dramatic wound was self-inflicted. In 2011, the company hired Ron Johnson β the genius behind Apple's retail stores β as CEO. Johnson immediately eliminated coupons, sales events, and clearance racks, replacing JCPenney's famously complicated pricing with "everyday low prices." The result was catastrophic. Revenue dropped 25% in one year. Johnson was fired after just 17 months.
The core problem: Apple customers and JCPenney customers are fundamentally different shoppers. JCPenney's base loved the thrill of the hunt, the satisfaction of a coupon, the rush of a clearance rack. Johnson stripped away the psychology that made people shop there. The company never fully recovered, filing for Chapter 11 in May 2020 during the pandemic. It emerged under new ownership but continues shrinking.
Unlike Sears and JCPenney, Macy's decline has been more strategic than catastrophic. The company is executing a deliberate plan to close 150 underperforming stores by 2027 while investing heavily in 350 "go-forward" locations. These surviving stores get renovations, better inventory, and experiential features designed to compete with online retail.
Macy's biggest asset is its brand recognition and the Thanksgiving Day Parade, which keeps the name in the national consciousness. The Herald Square flagship in New York remains iconic. Whether the "shrink to survive" strategy works remains to be seen β it's essentially a bet that a smaller, better Macy's can be profitable in an era dominated by Amazon and fast fashion.
While peers collapsed, Nordstrom held relatively steady by leaning into what department stores theoretically do best: curation, service, and experience. Nordstrom's legendary customer service β the company empowers employees to make judgment calls on returns, exchanges, and special requests β created loyalty that pure e-commerce struggles to replicate.
Their off-price Nordstrom Rack chain has actually been growing, serving as a gateway drug for younger shoppers. The company went private in 2024 when the Nordstrom family took the company off the public markets, giving them flexibility to make long-term investments without quarterly earnings pressure. Among major department stores, Nordstrom is the closest thing to a success story.
Kmart's decline predates the internet era entirely. In the 1990s, Walmart simply out-executed Kmart on the discount retail model β better supply chains, lower prices, cleaner stores. Kmart filed for bankruptcy in 2002. Then Eddie Lampert bought both Kmart and Sears, merged them, and asset-stripped both into oblivion.
From 2,171 stores in 2000 to just 2 remaining in the continental US by 2024. The blue light special is permanently off.
The oldest department store chain in the US. Its Fifth Avenue flagship was a New York City landmark. Closed permanently in 2021 after 195 years. The building was sold to Amazon (then WeWork) β peak irony.
The luxury department store filed for bankruptcy in May 2020 but emerged in September. Catering to wealthy clientele provides insulation from the forces killing mid-market stores. Merged with Saks Fifth Avenue parent company in 2024.
The quiet survivor. Dillard's strategy of owning rather than leasing its real estate, focusing on the Sun Belt, and running lean operations has kept it profitable while flashier competitors collapsed. Wall Street barely notices, which is fine by them.
Another luxury survivor. The Saks brand carries weight in wealthy zip codes. Saks' parent company (HBC) acquired Neiman Marcus in 2024, creating a luxury department store powerhouse.
A Southern institution. Belk operates primarily in 16 southeastern states. Filed for bankruptcy in 2021 but emerged quickly. Regional loyalty keeps it alive where national chains have failed.
Macy's upscale sibling. Bloomingdale's smaller store count and premium positioning have kept it more stable than its parent company's namesake chain.
The stores that defined mall culture β who survived and who didn't
The stores that survived the mall apocalypse share key traits: they sell experiential or sensory products that can't easily be replicated online (Bath & Body Works' scents, Spencer's weird gifts, Claire's ear piercing), they adapted to new consumer interests (Hot Topic pivoting from music to anime/K-pop), or they occupy a niche so specific that e-commerce hasn't bothered to compete (Cinnabon's fresh-baked smell, Spencer's in-person weirdness).
The stores that died shared common vulnerabilities: they sold easily commoditized products (music, books, electronics) that Amazon and digital distribution could deliver cheaper and faster. Borders outsourced its online sales to Amazon. Sam Goody couldn't compete with iTunes. RadioShack sold components that hobbyists could find online. When your product can be digitized or shipped in a box, the mall provides no advantage.
The economics and nostalgia of America's communal dining room
The mall food court as we know it emerged in the late 1970s, pioneered by developer James Rouse at the Paramus Park mall in New Jersey. The concept was simple but brilliant: cluster fast food vendors around a shared seating area, creating a destination within the mall that extended visit times and gave shoppers a reason to stay. By the mid-1980s, virtually every enclosed mall in America had a food court, and brands like Orange Julius, Sbarro, and Panda Express became synonymous with the experience. The food court was America's communal dining room β diverse, affordable, and democratic.
The most successful food court graduate. Started as a single restaurant inside the Glendale Galleria mall in 1983. Now 2,400+ locations, most standalone. Proved that food court brands could transcend the mall.
Truett Cathy opened the first Chick-fil-A inside Atlanta's Greenbriar Mall in 1967. The chain spent its first 19 years exclusively in malls. Now the third-largest restaurant chain in the US with mostly standalone drive-throughs.
Expanding beyond malls into airports, gas stations (Pilot Flying J), and even grocery stores (packaged products). The brand recognized that the smell works everywhere, not just in mall corridors.
Aggressively expanding into non-mall locations: airports, Walmart stores, travel plazas, and food trucks. The pretzel travels well.
The biggest, the oldest, the most famous, and the most dead
Bloomington, Minnesota β 5.6 million sq ft total (2.87M retail). Opened 1992. Over 500 stores, Nickelodeon Universe indoor theme park, SEA LIFE aquarium. 40 million visitors annually. Built on the former site of Metropolitan Stadium (where the Vikings and Twins played).
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania β 2.7 million sq ft. The result of merging two adjacent malls (The Plaza and The Court) in 2016. Over 400 stores. The largest retail space on the East Coast.
Costa Mesa, California β 2.7 million sq ft. The highest-grossing mall in the US by revenue (~$2 billion annually). Anchored by luxury brands: Gucci, Louis Vuitton, Chanel. More of a luxury destination than a traditional mall.
Torrance, California β 2.5 million sq ft. Once the largest mall in the US before Mall of America opened. Major renovation in 2015 added luxury retail.
Aventura, Florida β 2.7 million sq ft. Features a 93-foot slide designed by Carsten HΓΆller. One of the top-grossing malls in the country. Draws tourists and locals alike in the Miami metro area.
Syracuse, New York β 2.4 million sq ft. Originally planned as a mega-complex with a hotel, convention center, and renewable energy features. Many of those plans were scaled back, but it remains the largest mall in New York state.
Sunrise, Florida β 2.4 million sq ft. The largest single-story outlet mall in the US. A tourist destination for international shoppers seeking discounted designer goods.
Garden City, New York β 2.3 million sq ft. Built on the site of Roosevelt Field airport, where Charles Lindbergh began his transatlantic flight. The second-largest mall in New York and one of the highest-grossing in the country.
Edina, Minnesota β The first fully enclosed, climate-controlled shopping mall in the United States. Designed by Victor Gruen, an Austrian architect who envisioned malls as European-style town squares. Gruen later disowned the suburban mall concept, calling it a distortion of his vision. Still operating today, though significantly renovated.
Seattle, Washington β Often cited as the first regional shopping center in the US (opened as open-air in 1950, enclosed later). Being redeveloped into a mixed-use community with light rail access. The mall era coming full circle.
Glen Burnie, Maryland β One of the earliest enclosed malls on the East Coast. Was renovated into the Harundale Plaza shopping center. No longer an enclosed mall but the retail location persists.
Phoenix, Arizona β Opened in 1961 as one of the earliest enclosed malls in the western US. Renovated into an outdoor "lifestyle center" (now called CityScape) β a common fate for aging malls.
North Randall, Ohio β Once the largest mall in the world when it opened in 1976 (2.2 million sq ft). Closed in 2009. Its enormous empty husk became one of the most photographed dead malls before demolition. Now an Amazon fulfillment center. The symbolism writes itself.
Akron, Ohio β Became the internet's favorite dead mall. Photos of its overgrown, water-damaged interior went viral. Trees grew through the floor. The epitome of dead mall aesthetics. Demolished and replaced with a distribution center.
Harvey, Illinois β Famous for the Blues Brothers car chase scene filmed inside after the mall closed in 1979. Sat abandoned for 33 years, becoming a haven for urban explorers. Finally demolished in 2012.
Crestwood, Missouri β Opened in 1957 as one of the first malls in the St. Louis area. Closed in 2013. Its long decline and bitter political battles over redevelopment made it a case study in dead mall politics.
West Mifflin, Pennsylvania β Once the largest mall in the Pittsburgh area. Its slow death was documented extensively by local media. The building still stands, in legal limbo over demolition costs and redevelopment plans.
Hawthorne, California β Closed in 1999 and abandoned. Became an eerie shooting location for movies and TV shows. The massive structure sat empty for over two decades, slowly being reclaimed by nature inside.
Seven decades of American retail, from Southdale to the adaptive reuse era
The mall brands you know are mostly owned by a handful of massive conglomerates. Decades of mergers, acquisitions, bankruptcies, and private equity deals have consolidated hundreds of brands under a few corporate umbrellas. This chart shows who owns what β and how the pieces moved.
The "brand zombie factory." ABG buys dead or dying brands, strips the retail operations, and licenses the names to other companies. They own an astonishing collection of former mall anchors.
The most devastating retail acquisition in history. Eddie Lampert's hedge fund ESL bought Kmart out of bankruptcy (2003), merged it with Sears (2005), and then systematically stripped both companies for real estate value while letting the retail operations die.
Started as a glove manufacturer in 1899. Built an empire of mall and lifestyle brands through acquisitions. Recently struggling β sold several brands and facing declining revenue.
The "accessible luxury" conglomerate. Started as Coach, renamed to Tapestry to house multiple brands. Tried to buy Capri Holdings (Versace/Jimmy Choo/Michael Kors) for $8.5B in 2023 but the FTC blocked it.
Les Wexner built the most powerful mall empire of the 1990s. The Limited, Express, Victoria's Secret, Bath & Body Works, Abercrombie β all came from one man's vision. Then it all fell apart.
The biggest mall landlord in America. When tenants started dying, Simon started buying them β not to save them, but to control what goes into their own malls.
Five essays on the American mall β its rise, its culture, and its uncertain future
The American shopping mall is dying, and has been dying for a long time. What makes the death remarkable isn't the economic data β though the numbers are staggering β but the cultural void it leaves behind. For roughly four decades, the enclosed shopping mall was the center of American suburban life: the place where teenagers went on Friday nights, where families did their Christmas shopping, where small business owners opened their first store, where people went just to walk around and be among other people.
Victor Gruen designed Southdale Center in 1956 as a European-style town square β a climate-controlled gathering place where suburbanites could experience the communal vitality of urban life without actually living in a city. The irony is thick: Gruen, a Viennese Jewish architect who fled the Nazis, created the most American of institutions. And he hated what it became. By the 1970s, Gruen had disowned the suburban mall, calling it a distortion of everything he intended.
At their peak in the late 1980s, America had approximately 2,500 enclosed shopping malls. Today, roughly 700 remain, and industry analysts project that 25% of those will close by 2030. The causes are well-documented: e-commerce (Amazon captured the convenience factor), the collapse of anchor department stores (Sears, JCPenney, Macy's shed thousands of locations), changing consumer preferences (experiences over things), and the COVID-19 pandemic (which accelerated a decline already well underway).
But the deeper cause is cultural. The mall's core value proposition was never just shopping β it was gathering. It was the third place between home and work. When Amazon made shopping more convenient from your couch, the mall had to justify itself as a destination. Most couldn't.
The aesthetic of the dead mall has become its own genre. Photographers like Seph Lawless have built careers documenting the eerie beauty of abandoned retail spaces β escalators frozen mid-step, food court tables still arranged for diners who will never come, skylights filtering dusty light onto empty corridors. There's something compelling about these images that goes beyond ruin porn. They document the death of a particular version of American optimism: the belief that consumption could create community, that commerce could substitute for civic life.
The adaptive reuse movement offers a pragmatic answer. Dead malls are becoming apartments (Austin's Highland Mall is now a community college), medical centers, fulfillment warehouses (Randall Park Mall, once the world's largest, is now an Amazon facility), and public parks. The mall's physical infrastructure β large, climate-controlled spaces with ample parking β turns out to be useful for many purposes beyond retail.
But nothing has replaced the mall's social function. There is no new third place for suburban America. The internet provides connection without presence, community without proximity. Whether that's enough is a question that extends well beyond retail.
The mall was a machine with a specific design: anchor department stores at each end, drawing foot traffic through corridors lined with smaller specialty shops. The anchors were the engine. When the engine dies, the machine stops working. And between 2000 and 2024, the engines died one by one.
Sears was once the largest retailer in the world. Its catalog was the internet before the internet β you could order anything from socks to a pre-fabricated house. The company built the tallest building in the world (the Sears Tower, completed 1973). At peak, Sears operated approximately 3,500 stores across the country.
The story of Sears' death is fundamentally a story about what happens when a financier runs a retailer. Eddie Lampert, a hedge fund manager who idolized Ayn Rand, acquired Kmart in 2003 and engineered its merger with Sears in 2005. From the beginning, Lampert treated both companies as portfolios of assets to be monetized rather than retail businesses to be operated. He sold off iconic brands (Craftsman, Lands' End, DieHard), spun off real estate into a separate REIT, slashed store maintenance budgets, and pitted divisions against each other in an internal competition framework inspired by objectivist philosophy.
The results were predictable. Stores deteriorated. Customers fled. Employees β demoralized and underpaid β provided worse service. Revenue fell every single year from 2007 to 2018. Sears filed for bankruptcy in October 2018 with 68,000 employees. Lampert's hedge fund bought what remained. Today, roughly 12 Sears stores survive.
If Sears was murdered by private equity, JCPenney's most devastating wound was self-inflicted. In 2011, the board hired Ron Johnson β the retail genius who created Apple's phenomenally successful retail stores β as CEO. Johnson immediately ripped out everything that made JCPenney work for its customers: coupons, sales events, clearance racks, and the complicated pricing psychology that drove traffic.
His replacement: "Fair and Square" everyday low pricing. Clean, minimalist store design. Boutique-within-a-store concepts. It was exactly what you'd do if you were redesigning JCPenney for people who shop at Apple stores. The problem: JCPenney customers aren't Apple customers. They loved the hunt. The coupon was the point. Revenue dropped 25% in one year β from $17.3 billion to $13 billion. Johnson was fired after 17 months.
The company never fully recovered. Successive CEOs tried to undo the damage, but the customers who left during the Johnson era found other places to shop. JCPenney filed for Chapter 11 in May 2020 and emerged under new ownership with 667 stores β down from 2,053 at peak.
When an anchor tenant closes, mall foot traffic drops 10-25%. The remaining shops see sales decline. Leases don't get renewed. The vacancy rate climbs. More shops leave. The death spiral accelerates. A mall with two anchors can survive losing one. A mall that loses both is terminal. This is what happened across America: as Sears, JCPenney, and Macy's shed locations, the malls that depended on them collapsed like buildings losing load-bearing walls.
If you were a teenager in suburban America between 1985 and 2000, the mall was your world. Not a part of your world β your actual world. It was where you hung out on Saturday afternoons, where you got your first job, where you went on dates, where you shoplifted a tube of lip gloss and felt the rush of adrenaline that only a 14-year-old can feel. The mall was the internet before the internet: a place to see and be seen, to discover new things, to waste time in the most productive way possible.
Every mall had a social geography that teenagers navigated with the instinct of anthropologists. The food court was the commons β neutral territory where anyone could sit. The arcade (usually a Tilt or Aladdin's Castle) was where the boys went. Claire's and the jewelry kiosks were where the girls went. Spencer's was where you went to be scandalous. The record store (Sam Goody, Musicland, or Tower Records) was where the cool kids browsed. The bookstore (B. Dalton or Waldenbooks) was where the nerds went. And Hot Topic β the store with the loud music and the black walls β was where the weird kids found each other.
For millions of Americans, their first job was at the mall. Folding shirts at Gap. Scooping ice cream at Baskin-Robbins. Selling sneakers at Foot Locker. These jobs taught a generation the basics of customer service, time management, and the art of looking busy when the manager walks by. The mall was America's unofficial vocational school for teenagers.
No discussion of mall culture is complete without the food court. Orange Julius (founded 1926, peak 480 locations) served its frothy orange drink from a counter that was usually right at the entrance. Sbarro gave you a slice of pizza roughly the size of your torso. Panda Express introduced middle America to orange chicken. And Cinnabon β the warm, sweet smell of Cinnabon rolling through the corridors β was the mall's signature perfume.
The food court was democratic. A family of five could eat for $25. A teenager could nurse a small drink for two hours. Nobody judged you for sitting alone. In a culture that was becoming increasingly stratified, the mall food court was one of the last affordable, indoor, public gathering spaces.
The mall's golden age ended gradually, then suddenly. The internet gave teenagers a new place to socialize (first AOL Instant Messenger, then MySpace, then everything else). Parents became more anxious about unsupervised teenage gathering. The stores that teens loved β Sam Goody, Tower Records, Borders β closed as their products went digital. By 2010, the teenager hanging out at the mall was becoming as quaint as the teenager hanging out at the soda fountain. The space remained, but the culture had moved online.
The mall food court is one of America's great unrecognized democratic institutions. For roughly 40 years, it was the place where a construction worker and a lawyer could sit at adjacent tables, eating from the same Panda Express, without anyone thinking it was unusual. The food court asked nothing of you except that you buy something β and even that was loosely enforced.
The modern food court concept emerged in the late 1970s, generally credited to developer James Rouse. The insight was elegant: cluster fast food vendors around shared seating, creating a dining destination that extended mall visit times. If shoppers could eat without leaving the mall, they'd stay longer and spend more. It worked. By the mid-1980s, virtually every enclosed mall in America had a food court, and the format became so standardized that you could walk into any food court in any city and find roughly the same lineup: pizza, Chinese, chicken, pretzels, cookies.
Food court economics were brutal for vendors. Rents were high β often $80-120 per square foot, compared to $30-50 for regular mall tenants. But the foot traffic was guaranteed. A food court vendor in a busy mall could do $600,000-$1.2 million in annual revenue from a 400-square-foot space. The margins were thin (5-12%), but the volume was relentless. Success depended on speed: get them in, feed them, get them out. The average food court transaction took under 3 minutes.
The smartest food court brands escaped the mall before the mall died. Panda Express went from a single food court location in 1983 to 2,400+ standalone restaurants. Chick-fil-A spent its first 19 years exclusively in malls before pivoting to drive-through-centric standalone locations. Cinnabon, Auntie Anne's, and Wetzel's Pretzels expanded into airports, gas stations, and Walmart stores.
The brands that stayed mall-dependent suffered. Sbarro peaked at over 1,000 locations and went bankrupt twice (2011, 2014). Orange Julius was absorbed into Dairy Queen. Mrs. Fields shrank from 700+ to roughly 250 locations. Hot Dog on a Stick β recognizable by its striped uniforms and hand-stomped lemonade β is down to about 40 locations.
There's a reason food court nostalgia persists in a way that, say, nostalgia for mall shoe stores does not. Food is inherently experiential and sensory. The smell of Cinnabon, the taste of an Orange Julius, the ritual of choosing from eight different vendors and carrying your tray to a table β these create memories that online shopping never will. The food court was the mall's emotional core, the place where the building felt most alive.
In the wreckage of the American mall, a handful of stores are not only surviving β they're growing. Understanding why illuminates what e-commerce can and cannot replace.
Bath & Body Works is arguably the most successful mall-based retailer of the 21st century. The company's 1,800+ stores generate over $6 billion in annual revenue, driven primarily by three-wick candles that have achieved cult status. The semi-annual sale creates genuine frenzy β people line up, fill bags, and spend hundreds of dollars on candles.
Why does it work? Scent is the most primitive and emotionally evocative of the senses. You can't smell a candle through a screen. Bath & Body Works' stores are designed as sensory experiences: testers on every shelf, the air thick with fragrance, the promise of seasonal limited editions creating urgency. Amazon can ship you a candle, but it can't replicate the experience of walking into the store, smelling 40 options, and impulse-buying five things you didn't plan to buy. That gap between online convenience and in-store experience is where Bath & Body Works lives.
Hot Topic's survival is a masterclass in cultural adaptation. Founded in 1989 as a music-focused store selling band T-shirts and concert merch, Hot Topic has reinvented itself every few years to track whatever subcultural wave is rising. When emo peaked, they sold emo merch. When anime went mainstream, they became the go-to for anime merchandise. When K-pop exploded, BTS and Blackpink merch appeared overnight.
The key insight: Hot Topic doesn't sell products so much as it sells identity. Teenagers and young adults use its merchandise to signal who they are and what tribe they belong to. That identity-signaling function requires browsing, touching, trying on β it's inherently experiential. And because the fandoms Hot Topic serves are passionate and impatient, fans want the merch now, not in two days via Prime shipping.
Spencer's Gifts has survived since 1947 by being genuinely irreplaceable. The mix of gag gifts, lava lamps, novelty items, and adults-only merchandise in the back creates an experience that is impossible to replicate online. Part of Spencer's appeal has always been the transgressive thrill of being in the store β especially for teenagers. That thrill requires physical presence.
The surviving mall stores share a single characteristic: they sell experiences that screens cannot replicate. Scent (Bath & Body Works, Yankee Candle). Identity and belonging (Hot Topic). Transgressive novelty (Spencer's). Ear piercing (Claire's). Fresh-baked aroma (Cinnabon). These aren't things you can add to a cart on Amazon. They require your body to be present, your senses engaged, your social context active. The stores that died β music stores, bookstores, electronics retailers β sold commoditized products that a website could deliver faster and cheaper. The survivors sell something a website fundamentally cannot.
In 1995, e-commerce accounted for 0.6% of total U.S. retail sales. Malls were thriving with roughly 1,500 enclosed shopping centers across America. For the first decade of online shopping, malls barely noticed. Amazon was a bookstore. eBay was for collectibles.
The data shows a near-perfect inverse correlation: as e-commerce share climbed from 1% (2000) to 5% (2008) to 10% (2017) to 17% (2024), active enclosed malls fell from 1,400 to 1,200 to 950 to 700. For every percentage point e-commerce gained, roughly 70 malls disappeared.
E-commerce alone didn't kill malls. The real death spiral was the anchor store collapse. When Sears, JCPenney, and Macy's started closing locations, they removed the gravitational force pulling shoppers to the mall. A single anchor closure typically led to 3-5 smaller store closures within 18 months.
In 2020, mall foot traffic dropped 58% from 2015 levels. It has never recovered. Even by 2024, traffic remains 35% below pre-pandemic norms. The shoppers who left during lockdown discovered they could get everything online and many never came back.
Top-performing malls have become experiences: restaurants, entertainment, fitness, medical offices, and apartments. The mall of the future isn't a shopping center β it's a mixed-use community hub that happens to have some stores.
When Landmark Mall in Alexandria, Virginia closed in 2017, the 51-acre site is being transformed into a $2 billion mixed-use community: 4,400 apartments, a hospital, parks, and retail β more housing than the original mall had shopping.
Mall land is well-located: near highways, with massive parking lots ready for redevelopment, in established suburbs with existing infrastructure. A dead mall on 50 acres of prime suburban land is a redevelopment goldmine.
Eastgate Mall in Chattanooga became Amazon's fulfillment center. The Metrocenter Mall in Phoenix is becoming a "15-minute city." The Arcade in Providence was converted into micro-apartments.
Some malls are finding middle ground. The Galleria in Houston added a hotel and ice rink. King of Prussia added luxury apartments adjacent to the mall. Destiny USA in Syracuse became an entertainment complex with go-karts, comedy clubs, and 3-story indoor adventure parks alongside traditional retail.
The enclosed shopping center as a pure retail concept is dying. What's replacing it is something more interesting β dense, walkable, mixed-use communities built on the bones of America's car-centric suburban experiment.